***
Beyond the
anthropocentric (aka linguistic) mistake: Languaging as if nature mattered
Morten Tønnessen
“How easy it is for inherited concepts to
stifle our senses!”
Abram 2010
“[F]orgive them, for they know not what they
do.”
Luke 23:34
Daniel Everett suggests that discourse entails
dark cognitive and cultural matter, namely what is not said but is still
somehow in discourse. How can we
study the «dark matter» of our enlightened worlds? Can we escape the tunnel-sight on language?
To
simple-minded humans (philosophers included), language largely constitutes
reality. And yet language is free to evolve at the inkling of an eye, the hunch
of a confused mind. Without
a doubt, language does in many senses open the world up to us – but it also conditions
and constrains us. Homo sapiens sapiens
is a creature that organises ecological reality in linguistic categories – both
perceptually and behaviourally. It is very “natural”, therefore, to commit the anthropocentric mistake, namely to
reason (erroneously) that human reality is practically all there is. We tend to
think in terms of language, and in terms of language, all is language. All is human language – all is human.
What we do not realize, when committing this
mistake, is that it is not only our
species that judges, that categorises, that is different, and so forth. It
takes a brilliant (and somewhat ludicrous) mind to differentiate between the
world as we see it and the world as it may be beyond (underneath, beneath)
language. The anthropocentric – or indeed linguistic – mistake,
then, consists in mistaking human reality for reality as such. Misjudging the
nature of reality, we misjudge our
nature – living nature – human nature. In consequence, even our
own distinctive nature is obscured. Is there a way out of this ‘house of language’?
Perhaps
there is. I suggest that language rather than being external to the human
Umwelt (von Uexküll), as fellow biosemioticians Sebeok and Hoffmeyer have
suggested, is internal to it. If so, then in a sense language is perception (and action) – and often perception
(and action) is language. If cognition is situated, embodied, extended and distributed, then we
must be able to be “thinking with animals” (Daston and Mitman (eds) 2005) in a
literal sense. In fact, aren’t we already? Examples to this effect will be
provided, demonstrating that we are indeed enmeshed in a cultural meshwork
(Thibault 2011) – which was never merely human – as well as in a natural meshwork.
References
Abram, David 2010. The Discourse of the Birds. Biosemiotics 3(3): 263-275.
Daston, Lorraine and Mitman, Gregg (eds) 2005. Thinking with Animals: New Perspectives on
Anthropomorphism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Thibault, Paul 2011. First-Order Languaging
Dynamics and Second-Order Language: The Distributed Language View. Ecological Psychology 23: 1–36.
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