Read-only link to "Understanding subjecthood and experience"

My correspondence text "Understanding subjecthood and experience", which clarifies my views in response to Jablonka and Ginsburg, is available for reading (only) here.

Jablonka and Ginsburg´s response to my commentary on their target article; with comments

In the recently published article "Living and Experiencing: Response to Commentaries", published in Biosemiotics, Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg respond to my commentary "The Evolutionary Origin(s) of the Umwelt", which was one out of several commentaries on their 2022 target article "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". While they overall present another impressively comprehensive article on the character, diversity and range of life, I feel that some of my views are misrepresented in their comments.

Excerpts:

Olteanu too (2022) points to the resonance between our theory and the biosemiotic approach to learning and consciousness, while other biosemioticians [Campbell (2022), Hendlin (2023), Tønnesson (2022)] emphasize both the common ground and the need to incorporate terms such as Umwelt into our framework and to expand on the continuity between life and mind.

No problem here.

The assumption that there is no life without sentience is reflected in the biopsychic stance of some of our commentators, who regard all living beings, from bacteria to humans, as sentient. This biopsychic assumption is clearly stated by Reber et al. (2022) and by Meincke (2023), but a biopsychic stance is also implied in the commentaries of Hendlin (2023), Tønnessen (2022), and Riskin (2023).

I do not think this is accurate. I make no claim in my commentary that I think it is fair to characterize as adopting a biopsychic stance implying that all life is sentient. On the contrary, I distinguish clearly between sentient and non-sentient organisms, and thematize the emergence of sentience during the Cambrian explosion.

Maybe the a priori assumption that intrinsic value must be mentally experienced is related to a different understanding of the terms “subject” and “subjective experiencing”. Subjective experiencing, as Tønnessen (2022) defines it, is “the experiencing of the subject”. However, a “subject”, as we understand the term, does not necessarily have mental states. A subject does have closure (and hence also a necessary inwardness and individuality) and is an agent that interacts with object/s external to it, reacting differently to world-generated and self-generated identical stimuli. Such reafferent reactions, were, we suggested, the non-mental precursors of the mental sense of self, and such reactions may be thought of as constituting “subjecthood”. But such subjecthood is as yet not mental subjecthood. Olteanu (2022) may have interpreted our usage of the term “subjective” in biosemiotic terms (as belonging to a subject, as subjecthood) and not in the common sense of equating “subjective experiencing” with “mental experiencing”, implying private, mental states such as perceiving the taste of banana ice cream and feeling fear.

I agree that not all subjects have mental states, and that some subjecthood is mental whether other organisms´ subjecthood is non-mental. What I criticized in my commentary was Jablonka and Ginsburg´s conflation of subjective experience with consciousness in their target article. Specifically, I questioned "one of its basic premises, namely that it is justified to “use the terms consciousness and subjective experiencing as synonyms” (p. 2)".

As Tønnessen (2022) rightly points out, the origin of the Umwelt is very ancient. We believe, as we think he does, that the co-construction of organisms and their relevant environment is as ancient as life itself. We also agree with him that a “sense saturated” Umwelten emerged during the Cambrian (with UAL), but we do not understand the basis of his claim that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience.

I make no claim in my commentary to the effect "that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience." This is misrepresenting my views. I refer to nothing "mental" in my commentary, clearly distinguish between conscious and non-conscious organisms, with and without the capacity for sensation, and my portrayal of the emergence of "sense-saturated" Umwelten, on the background of non-sentient Umwelten, clearly opposes the views that Jablonka and Ginsburg attribute to me.

In my commentary, I write: 

"The origin of the Umwelt did not coincide with the origin of sentience or consciousness. Nor did subjecthood, or subjective experience, emerge during the Cambrian explosion, though more complex forms of subjective experience evolved at this time."

I find it hard to understand how this can be taken to imply that all life is sentient and conscious, as Jablonka and Ginsburg appear to think is my view. "Subjective experience", in my view, "is a graded phenomenon, and evolved gradually to more complex forms as organisms evolved from simple organisms to more complex organisms."

To speak at digital workshop "Animal (Pre)History, Agency & Legacy" May 12th; abstract: "Individuality and subjectivity in animals in light of Umwelt temporality"

I have been scheduled to speak at the interdisciplinary online workshop "Animal (Pre)History, Agency & Legacy", organized by the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at University of Bielefeld, Germany and to be held via Zoom 10-12 May 2021. The workshop is organized by Stephanie Zehnle and Shumon T. Hussain. My talk, "Individuality and subjectivity in animals in light of Umwelt temporality", is scheduled for live presentation on May 12th at 13.00-13.30 CET. The workshop is not a public event, but for invited participants only.

ABSTRACT:

Individuality and subjectivity in animals in light of Umwelt temporality

Morten Tønnessen

In a biosemiotic understanding, all animals are endowed with an Umwelt as described by the German-Baltic biologist Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944) in his classical Umwelt theory, which was developed in the period between 1909 and 1940. In my work, I have focused on developing perspectives on Umwelt temporality, starting with a notion of “Umwelt transition” (i.e., environmental change as seen from an Umwelt perspective). While some Umwelt transitions are regular (e.g. developmental), others represent historical events. Another central term in my work is “Umwelt trajectory”, representing the path through time taken by a living being as described by way of its changing relations to significant others. These notions may be applied in historical studies as well as futures studies. This provides us with a theoretical framework and methodology for studying animals as agents endowed with individual semiotic agency.

Program area "Philosophy and subjectivity" approved; launches May 1st

Yesterday we were notified that University of Stavanger, or more specifically the Dean of Faculty of Social Sciencesm has approved the establishment of the program area for research "Filosofi og subjektivitet" [Philosophy and subjectivity], with me among the core members. The program area is officially established May 1st and for now runs until December 31st.

Research program area application submitted

Our revised application for establishment of a research program area on philosophy and subjectivity was submitted yesterday.

Meeting in preparation of program area on subjectivity

Last week I attended a meeting with two colleagues in preparation of our program area application focusing on subjectivity. We particularly focused on external funding plans, but also other aspects.

Program area application - status

The program area research application of the philosophers, in which I am involved, has not yet been formally submitted, but has received some critical feedback that will need to be addressed.

Subjectivity program area application said to be submitted

About a week ago, I am told, the philosophers´ application for a research program area on philosophical and scientific perspectives on subjectivity was submitted to the head of department at Department of media and social sciences. I am involved as one of the several core researchers.

Work lunch with research theme

Today I discussed aspects of a program area research application with a colleague during a work lunch.

Skype meeting for philosophers

Today I participated in a philosopher meeting via Skype involving a group in Rome and another at University of Stavanger, in relation to our application in preparation of establishing a new program area for research.