Today I have written and submitted a Letter to the editor - or Correspondence - to Biosemiotics, titled "Understanding subjecthood and experience", in response to Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg´s article "Living and Experiencing: Response to Commentaries", which was recently published in Biosemiotics.
See also:
Jablonka and Ginsburg´s response to my commentary on their target article; with comments
In the recently published article "Living and Experiencing: Response to Commentaries", published in Biosemiotics, Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg respond to my commentary "The Evolutionary Origin(s) of the Umwelt", which was one out of several commentaries on their 2022 target article "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". While they overall present another impressively comprehensive article on the character, diversity and range of life, I feel that some of my views are misrepresented in their comments.
Excerpts:
Olteanu too (2022) points to the resonance between our theory and the biosemiotic approach to learning and consciousness, while other biosemioticians [Campbell (2022), Hendlin (2023), Tønnesson (2022)] emphasize both the common ground and the need to incorporate terms such as Umwelt into our framework and to expand on the continuity between life and mind.
No problem here.
The assumption that there is no life without sentience is reflected in the biopsychic stance of some of our commentators, who regard all living beings, from bacteria to humans, as sentient. This biopsychic assumption is clearly stated by Reber et al. (2022) and by Meincke (2023), but a biopsychic stance is also implied in the commentaries of Hendlin (2023), Tønnessen (2022), and Riskin (2023).
I do not think this is accurate. I make no claim in my commentary that I think it is fair to characterize as adopting a biopsychic stance implying that all life is sentient. On the contrary, I distinguish clearly between sentient and non-sentient organisms, and thematize the emergence of sentience during the Cambrian explosion.
Maybe the a priori assumption that intrinsic value must be mentally experienced is related to a different understanding of the terms “subject” and “subjective experiencing”. Subjective experiencing, as Tønnessen (2022) defines it, is “the experiencing of the subject”. However, a “subject”, as we understand the term, does not necessarily have mental states. A subject does have closure (and hence also a necessary inwardness and individuality) and is an agent that interacts with object/s external to it, reacting differently to world-generated and self-generated identical stimuli. Such reafferent reactions, were, we suggested, the non-mental precursors of the mental sense of self, and such reactions may be thought of as constituting “subjecthood”. But such subjecthood is as yet not mental subjecthood. Olteanu (2022) may have interpreted our usage of the term “subjective” in biosemiotic terms (as belonging to a subject, as subjecthood) and not in the common sense of equating “subjective experiencing” with “mental experiencing”, implying private, mental states such as perceiving the taste of banana ice cream and feeling fear.
I agree that not all subjects have mental states, and that some subjecthood is mental whether other organisms´ subjecthood is non-mental. What I criticized in my commentary was Jablonka and Ginsburg´s conflation of subjective experience with consciousness in their target article. Specifically, I questioned "one of its basic premises, namely that it is justified to “use the terms consciousness and subjective experiencing as synonyms” (p. 2)".
As Tønnessen (2022) rightly points out, the origin of the Umwelt is very ancient. We believe, as we think he does, that the co-construction of organisms and their relevant environment is as ancient as life itself. We also agree with him that a “sense saturated” Umwelten emerged during the Cambrian (with UAL), but we do not understand the basis of his claim that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience.
I make no claim in my commentary to the effect "that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience." This is misrepresenting my views. I refer to nothing "mental" in my commentary, clearly distinguish between conscious and non-conscious organisms, with and without the capacity for sensation, and my portrayal of the emergence of "sense-saturated" Umwelten, on the background of non-sentient Umwelten, clearly opposes the views that Jablonka and Ginsburg attribute to me.
In my commentary, I write:
"The origin of the Umwelt did not coincide with the origin of sentience or consciousness. Nor did subjecthood, or subjective experience, emerge during the Cambrian explosion, though more complex forms of subjective experience evolved at this time."
I find it hard to understand how this can be taken to imply that all life is sentient and conscious, as Jablonka and Ginsburg appear to think is my view. "Subjective experience", in my view, "is a graded phenomenon, and evolved gradually to more complex forms as organisms evolved from simple organisms to more complex organisms."
Over the two last days, Wednesday and Thursday, I have had half an article day, devoted to finishing my Commentary article "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt" - a commentary on Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg´s Target article in Biosemiotics, "Learning and the Evolution of Conscious Agents", with some 900 words written. Number of writing days this Autumn is up to 9.
Yesterday, on my way back from Thessaloniki towards Stavanger, I had half a writing day, with readings done related to a commentary I will likely write for Biosemiotics on a Target article by Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg, "Learning av the evolution of conscious agents". Number of writing days so far this Autumn is up to 7.
I have just proof-read my commentary "Making the Umwelt Bubble of the Modern Synthesis Burst", which is to be published in Biosemiotics as a commentary to Denis Noble´s Target article "The illusions of the Modern synthesis".
Yogi Hale Hendlin´s editorial in his first issue as Editor-in-Chief of Biosemiotics has just been published, titled "Expanding the reach of Biosemiotics". In the same issue, the journal´s first Target Article with a number of invited Commentaries will also appear. I served as an Editor-in-Chief until the end of last year, after which Yogi took over as Editor-in-Chief.
Excerpts:
Taking up this role of Editor-in-Chief also prompted reflection on all those whose leadership at this journal has developed the discipline into an oasis for robust transdisciplinary dialog. Most immediately prior, I’d like to thank previous Editor-in-Chief Morten Tønnessen for his many years of leadership at the journal, as well as Filip Jaroš, and Timo Maran. Marcello Barbieri, the journal’s first Editor-in-Chief, helped launch Biosemiotics in 2008. And finally, Alexei Sharov, my fellow current Editor-in-Chief, deserves thanks for his steady and indispensable guidance of the journal.
In the current iteration of Biosemiotics, we have shifted from three Editors-in-Chief to two; but have expanded the journal leadership to include five Associate Editors plus an Intern. We are grateful for all of their contributions towards making this journal run smoothly and to expanding Biosemiotics’ reach and capacity. One reason for the need for this greater capacity is to accommodate the new article type of Target Articles and Commentaries pioneered by Morten Tønnessen. It is my pleasure to work with the Editorial Board of Biosemiotics, the Associate Editors and Intern, and the Members and Executive Board of the International Society for Biosemiotic Studies in continuing their devoted work in this tradition.
I have just been notified that my Commentary article "Making the Umwelt bubble of the Modern Synthesis burst" has been accepted for publication in Biosemiotics.
Today I had an article writing day devoted to revising my commentary article "Making the Umwelt bubble of the Modern Synthesis burst" (a commentary to Denis Noble´s target article "The illusions of the Modern Synthesis"), with some 300 words written in the process (net). The commentary will be published in Biosemiotics.
Total number of writing days so far this Spring is up to 28,5.
The first Target Article of Biosemiotics has been published. It is written by Denis Noble, Emeritus Professor of Cardiovascular Physiology, Oxford University, and titled "The illusions of the Modern Synthesis".
Noble cites three of my articles:
Tønnessen, M. (2010). Wolf land. Biosemiotics, 3, 289–297.
Tønnessen, M. (2015a). The biosemiotic glossary project: Agent, agency. Biosemiotics, 8, 125–143.
Tønnessen, M. (2015b). Umwelt and language. In Velmezova, E., Kull, K., Cowley, S.J. (Eds) Biosemiotic Perspectives on Language and Linguistics. Springer. Pp. 77–96.
Excerpts:
I
"I think Darwin was right and was brilliantly foresighted to resist Wallace’s attempt to subsume intentional sexual (and by implication other forms of social) selection to natural selection. Brilliant because I think he must have been aware of the importance of the distinction he was making. He did not use the word agency, but I think he would have agreed with biosemioticians that the concept is necessary to understand the meanings organisms give to the signs and communicative paradigms they use (Tønnessen 2015a)."
II
"If we follow Ginsburg and Jablonka’s (2019) arguments for attributing conscious action to many other organisms capable of unlimited associative learning, then those organisms must also be capable of intended or unintended illusions. I am assuming here, of course, that conscious meaning is a prerequisite of the creation of illusions. I think that biosemiotics could make valuable contributions to this issue. As an example, through understanding the perspective (the Umwelt) of an animal like the wolf (Tønnessen 2010) we may come to understand its possible use of illusory behavior in predator-prey interactions and in signaling within social networks. Organisms capable of anticipatory behavior surely must use such tactics in successful hunting, just as conscious prey must do so to avoid them. I suspect that this must be what Tønnessen has in mind when he refers to “the naïvety of prey”. They become less naïve precisely through developing anticipation of the diversionary signs from predators.
Of course, I am not suggesting that all illusory signs in organisms are intended. ..."
III
"Tønnessen (2015b) has also addressed the application of Umwelt theory to human language in which he argues that “language is not external to Umwelt, but internal to it. Language changes the human Umwelt not by escaping or sidelining it, but by fundamentally transforming it.” This gets to the core of what I think happened in the development of the illusions of the Modern Synthesis between 1940 and the end of the last century. Language was crafted in creating a coherent model of how organisms work and how they depend on and interact with their environment. In a biosemiotic context we could call it the Umwelt, the mind-set on the nature of the environment-organism interaction, of the Modern Synthesis."
Noble´s article is Open Access and can be read and downloaded here on the homepage of the journal.
Commentaries to the Target Article are soon to be published, including one written by me.
Tonight I have had half an article writing day, and written a commentary on Denis Noble´s Target article for Biosemiotics "The illusions of the Modern Synthesis", with some 1.800 words written. I also sent a proof-read version of "Neurosemiotics across species" (Routledge handbook chapter) to the editors along with Contributor agreement and bionote.
Total number of writing days so far this Spring is up to 17.
