Climate pasts and futures paper scheduled for presentation at "Cognition and Evolution in Historical and Social Research" conference September 24th

My paper «Prospective Studies of Contested Climate Pasts and Futures» has been scheduled for oral presentation at the conference "Cognition and Evolution in Historical and Social Research", which takes place at Lund University, Sweden, September 23-24th, on Wednesday September 24th at 11.55–12.15, as part of session 5, «Contemporary society». The presentation will be given digitally.

Read-only link to "Understanding subjecthood and experience"

My correspondence text "Understanding subjecthood and experience", which clarifies my views in response to Jablonka and Ginsburg, is available for reading (only) here.

Jablonka and Ginsburg´s response to my commentary on their target article; with comments

In the recently published article "Living and Experiencing: Response to Commentaries", published in Biosemiotics, Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg respond to my commentary "The Evolutionary Origin(s) of the Umwelt", which was one out of several commentaries on their 2022 target article "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". While they overall present another impressively comprehensive article on the character, diversity and range of life, I feel that some of my views are misrepresented in their comments.

Excerpts:

Olteanu too (2022) points to the resonance between our theory and the biosemiotic approach to learning and consciousness, while other biosemioticians [Campbell (2022), Hendlin (2023), Tønnesson (2022)] emphasize both the common ground and the need to incorporate terms such as Umwelt into our framework and to expand on the continuity between life and mind.

No problem here.

The assumption that there is no life without sentience is reflected in the biopsychic stance of some of our commentators, who regard all living beings, from bacteria to humans, as sentient. This biopsychic assumption is clearly stated by Reber et al. (2022) and by Meincke (2023), but a biopsychic stance is also implied in the commentaries of Hendlin (2023), Tønnessen (2022), and Riskin (2023).

I do not think this is accurate. I make no claim in my commentary that I think it is fair to characterize as adopting a biopsychic stance implying that all life is sentient. On the contrary, I distinguish clearly between sentient and non-sentient organisms, and thematize the emergence of sentience during the Cambrian explosion.

Maybe the a priori assumption that intrinsic value must be mentally experienced is related to a different understanding of the terms “subject” and “subjective experiencing”. Subjective experiencing, as Tønnessen (2022) defines it, is “the experiencing of the subject”. However, a “subject”, as we understand the term, does not necessarily have mental states. A subject does have closure (and hence also a necessary inwardness and individuality) and is an agent that interacts with object/s external to it, reacting differently to world-generated and self-generated identical stimuli. Such reafferent reactions, were, we suggested, the non-mental precursors of the mental sense of self, and such reactions may be thought of as constituting “subjecthood”. But such subjecthood is as yet not mental subjecthood. Olteanu (2022) may have interpreted our usage of the term “subjective” in biosemiotic terms (as belonging to a subject, as subjecthood) and not in the common sense of equating “subjective experiencing” with “mental experiencing”, implying private, mental states such as perceiving the taste of banana ice cream and feeling fear.

I agree that not all subjects have mental states, and that some subjecthood is mental whether other organisms´ subjecthood is non-mental. What I criticized in my commentary was Jablonka and Ginsburg´s conflation of subjective experience with consciousness in their target article. Specifically, I questioned "one of its basic premises, namely that it is justified to “use the terms consciousness and subjective experiencing as synonyms” (p. 2)".

As Tønnessen (2022) rightly points out, the origin of the Umwelt is very ancient. We believe, as we think he does, that the co-construction of organisms and their relevant environment is as ancient as life itself. We also agree with him that a “sense saturated” Umwelten emerged during the Cambrian (with UAL), but we do not understand the basis of his claim that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience.

I make no claim in my commentary to the effect "that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience." This is misrepresenting my views. I refer to nothing "mental" in my commentary, clearly distinguish between conscious and non-conscious organisms, with and without the capacity for sensation, and my portrayal of the emergence of "sense-saturated" Umwelten, on the background of non-sentient Umwelten, clearly opposes the views that Jablonka and Ginsburg attribute to me.

In my commentary, I write: 

"The origin of the Umwelt did not coincide with the origin of sentience or consciousness. Nor did subjecthood, or subjective experience, emerge during the Cambrian explosion, though more complex forms of subjective experience evolved at this time."

I find it hard to understand how this can be taken to imply that all life is sentient and conscious, as Jablonka and Ginsburg appear to think is my view. "Subjective experience", in my view, "is a graded phenomenon, and evolved gradually to more complex forms as organisms evolved from simple organisms to more complex organisms."

Commentary "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt" published online

A few days ago my commentary article "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt" was published online in Biosemiotics. This is a commentary to Eva Jablonka & Simona Ginsburg´s Target article "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents".

Reference:

Tønnessen, Morten 2022. The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt. Commentary. Biosemiotics. Published online November 3rd 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12304-022-09506-7 

Jablonka and Ginsburg commentary accepted for publication

My Commentary article "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt" has been accepted for publication in Biosemiotics.

#10

Today, on the 10th writing day this Autumn, I have had a writing day devoted to updating my article "Wasted GDP in the USA" and making a requested amendment to my recently finished Commentary article "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt", with some 200 words written altogether.

#9

Over the two last days, Wednesday and Thursday, I have had half an article day, devoted to finishing my Commentary article "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt" - a commentary on Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg´s Target article in Biosemiotics, "Learning and the Evolution of Conscious Agents", with some 900 words written. Number of writing days this Autumn is up to 9.

#8,5

Today I have had half an article day, devoted mostly to writing a commentary to a Target article by Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg, "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". The work title of my commentary is "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt". I also added a couple of references to my book manuscript Captured. Altogether I wrote some 800 words.

Number of writing days this Autumn is 8,5 so far.

Commentary article "Making the Umwelt Bubble of the Modern Synthesis Burst" published in Biosemiotics

My commentary article on Denis Noble´s Target article "The illusions of the Modern synthesis" was published today.

Reference and link:

Tønnessen, Morten 2021a. Making the Umwelt Bubble of the Modern Synthesis Burst. Commentary. Biosemiotics. Published online May 9th 2021. DOI: 10.1007/s12304-021-09430-2

CFP for Biosemiotics special issue on the Extended Synthesis

A Call For Papers has been issued for a special issue of Biosemiotics guest-edited by Andrew Winters and titled "Semiotic aspects of the Extended Synthesis" - see the Biosemiosis blog. Paper proposals are due January 31st.

Full reference for third Biosemiotics editorial

Here is the full reference for our third editorial for Biosemiotics:

Sharov, Alexei, Timo Maran and Morten Tønnessen. Comprehending the semiosis of evolution. Editorial. Biosemiotics 9(1) 1–6. Published online April 4th 2016 (DOI: 10.1007/s12304-016-9262-7).

Blogpost in LifeScienceToday: "Biosemiotics: Making sense of nature"

Today a blogpost I have co-written with Alexei Sharov and Timo Maran as first author was published in Springer´s blog LifeScienceToday. Link and reference:

Tønnessen, Morten, Alexei Sharov and Timo Maran (2016). Biosemiotics: Making sense of nature. Published in Springer´s blog LifeScienceToday. URL: http://blogs.springer.com/lst/biosemiotics-making-sense-nature/.

Biosemiotics 9(1) published - special issue "Semiosis of evolution"; me an issue editor

Biosemiotics Volume 9 Number 1 har now been published. I am listed as issue editor along with Alexei Sharov and Timo Maran. The special issue is named "Semiosis of evolution". The issue also includes announcement of the first Biosemiotic Achievement Award, for the Year 2015.

Third Biosemiotics editorial published online: "Comprehending the semiosis of evolution"

Our third editorial has just been published online.

Reference:

Sharov, Alexei, Timo Maran and Morten Tønnessen (2016). Comprehending the semiosis of evolution. Editorial. Biosemiotics 9(1). Published online April 4th 2016 (DOI: 10.1007/s12304-016-9262-7).

Biosemiotics editorial on evolution proof-read

Today I have taken part in proof-reading our editorial for Biosemiotics 9(1), "Comprehending the Semiosis of Evolution".

Zoosemiotics abstract: Umwelt trajectories

I have just finished my abstract for the forthcoming zoosemiotics conference.

Morten Tønnessen

The Umwelt trajectories of wolves, sheep and people

Abstract for the conference ZOOSEMIOTICS AND ANIMAL REPRESENTATIONS

This paper contributes to developing Umwelt terminology, and simultaneously offers an analysis of past and current interrelations of wolves, sheep and people, thus providing an application of the notation suggested.

The starting point for the author’s terminology is the concept of an Umwelt transition, which is in effect an Uexküllian notion of environmental change. An Umwelt transition can be defined as a lasting, systematic change within the life cycle of a being, considered from an ontogenetic (individual), phylogenetic (population-, species-) or cultural perspective, from one typical appearance of its Umwelt (i.e., organism-specific phenomenal world) to another. An Umwelt trajectory, the author proposes, can be characterized as the course through evolutionary (and cultural) time taken by the Umwelt of a creature, as defined by its changing relations with the Umwelten of other creatures. Thus defined it represents an evolutionary and mass equivalent of Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of the Umwelt-tunnel of a single individual creature.

As we can see, the Umwelt trajectory of a creature is the historical path of its perceptual and behavioral dispositions considered from an ecological and phenomenological point of view. As such, it is intimately tied to this creature’s ontological niche, i.e. the set of contrapuntal relations that a being takes part in at a given point of natural history. Like the Umwelt tunnel and the ontological niche, the Umwelt trajectory of a creature can be regarded as a specification of the Umwelt concept which situates it in terms of temporal perspective.

Taken as a whole the Umwelten of wolves, sheep and people represent an Umwelt triad of sorts, given that they have been and remain intertwined and codependent. This triple Umwelt is telling of both ecological and cultural developments. In cultural terms, hardly any animals are as loaded with symbolic value as the wolf and the sheep. And the shared importance is no coincidence, as the symbolism of the two animals has developed in explicit opposition to each other. Altogether the wolf-sheep duet, the human-sheep duet and the human-wolf duet – to speak with Uexküll – constitute a highly coordinated triple duet in the great symphony of nature.

The most enlivening aspect of this narrative concerns the semiotic and phenomenological interplay that takes place amid wolves, sheep and people. While the most relevant long-term process of change varies from creature to creature – evolution for wolves, breeding for sheep and cultural development for people (all of which represent broad categories of Umwelt transitions) – there are several common factors at play as well. In this paper, the author will touch upon a) the geographical range and overlap, (b) the sensory range and overlap, and c) the functional range and overlap of wolves, sheep and people. The most crucial arena for semiotic interplay (and thus semiotic causation) is that of functional interrelations, particularly with regard to companionship and enmity. In our current ecological situation, where the human species has emerged as a global species in charge of an ecological empire wherein the sheep, among other species, has been given a privileged position, even the wolf has entered into a dependency relation with our kind. For better or worse, our Umwelt trajectories have (once again) aligned.

Course work on Uexküll - meetings at UiA - the philosophy business

I'm following the TÜ course "Readings of Juri Lotman and Jakob von Uexküll", and the first half, considering the work of Uexküll, has now finished. A couple of days ago I submitted the (first) term paper, "An Uexküllian Theory of Evolution?" (7 pp). I have further - since I literarily take the course as a reading course, from a distance - submitted 6 c3 pp papers with Q&As, covering the reading material.

“Uexküll and evolution” for many sounds like a topic that spells out a contradiction in terms. That, I believe, does not necessarily have to be the case. Whereas some biosemioticians (e.g. Stjernfelt 2001) have asserted that Uexküll was anti-evolution, others (e.g. Salthe 2001; Kull 2004) have concluded that he was anti-Darwinian, but not hostile to the idea of evolution as such. Here I must agree with the latter group, as I hope will shine through in the rest of this exposition. And not only do I think Uexküll was not anti-evolution (though, as I explain in Tønnessen 2009, he was programmatically not historically-minded) – more than that; I believe that an Uexküllian perspective might actually prove to be enriching within the field of evolutionary theory. There’s proof that Uexküll did not only have negative, but also positive, thought about evolution in his dictum (1928: 198) that “each new appearing functional cycle verifies [the appearance of] a new animal species” (my translation).

Meanwhile, the committee for the UiA Philosophy Forum has held its first meeting (this Monday).

So has - today - UiA's "Fagfilosofisk seksjon" (Academic philosophical section), consisting of the philosophers at Department of religion, philosophy and history. The topic, which has been discussed at one previous meeting as well and will be discussed further at the institute level in December, concerns establishing new (more advanced) courses in philosophy as part of a revised bachelor degree (which is today a bachelor in religion). One day, some say, we might offer a master in philosophy. That would truly be of great value for the philosophy milieu at UiA, and its attraction for students and scholars alike. Today only a one-year studium is offered (apart from the broader introductory course, Examen Philosophicum).

Meanwhile ... I have finished (yesterday) a catalogue, or leaflet (4 pp), presenting the paid services offered by my one-man company, SPØR FILOSOFEN (Ask the philosopher) - ranging from lectures and courses via writing and editing to consultancy activities. You'll find it on Scribd.

And thus the world advances...