Biosemiotics vs. Singer: Reference to "Steps to a semiotics of being" in ethics chapter by Gamlund

My article "Steps to a semiotics of being" (Biosemiotics 3 (2010): 375-392) is referred to in the following book chapter:

Gamlund, Espen 2013. Etiske perspektiver på dyr og natur [Ethical perspectives on animals and nature]. In: Ragnhild Sollund, Morten Tønnessen and Guri Larsen (eds), Hvem er villest i landet her: Råskap mot dyr og natur i antropocen, menneskets tidsalder [Who is wildest in this country here? Brutality towards animals and nature in the Anthropocene, the age of Man]. Oslo: Spartacus Forlag/Scandinavian Academic Press, 329-352.

The reference, found on p. 350, in footnote 14, concerns the role of sentience in animal ethics. On p. 344 Gamlund writes that (my translation) "Singer and his followers will say that the capability to feel lust and pain is necessary in order to have interests at all. Their justification is that without sentience there is nothing morally speaking to consider, since nothing can matter to an organism which cannot feel lust and pain." The footnote then reads: "But this is disputed by some biosemioticians. See for example Tønnessen 2010."