Yesterday I took part in a book launch at Stavanger antikvariat for the book Philsophising with Rocks. Henrik Steffens and the Anthropocene, which includes my chapter "Steffens’ early outlook reconsidered-Nature conceptions of the industrial-age Anthropocene". The event featured music, and a panel with Benedikt Jager, me, and Terje Torkildsen, chaired by Jørg Arne Jørgensen. 19 people attended altogether.
Thursday, 11 June 2026
Monday, 25 March 2024
Second Steffens chapter invited and planned for
I have agreed to contribute with a chapter work-titled "Steffens´ early outlook reconsidered: Nature conceptions of the industrial-age Anthropocene" for a book on the work of Henrik Steffens which is to be edited by Andreas Benedikt Jager and Marius Mjaaland and published by Karl Alber Verlag in 2025.
My first chapter on Steffens, titled "Steffens’ ideas about organic meteorology: From the Totalorganismus to planetary health?", written for the book Henrik Steffens in Context of the Sciences, Humanities, Philosophy, and Arts around 1800 (edited by Anna Lena Sandberg & Jesper Lundsfryd Rasmussen) was finished quite a while ago, but has not yet appeared in print.
Sunday, 3 October 2021
#15
Today I have had an article writing day, the 15th this Autumn, devoted to preparing my upcoming Henrik Steffens conference presentation and forthcoming book chapter, with some 50 words written in the process.
Sunday, 26 September 2021
#13
Today I have had an article writing day devoted mainly to revising my article with Joakim Jiri Haaland, and partly also to my upcoming Henrik Steffens conference presentation which will end up as an ethology chapter as well. I wrote some 300 words; and this is the 13th writing day so far this Autumn.
Tuesday, 28 April 2020
To contribute to Open semiotics book with chapter "Umwelt theory for practitioners"
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"Umwelt theory for practitioners: Practical guidelines for a more-than-human descriptive phenomenology"
By Morten Tønnessen
"Existential universals" article hopefully to be reprinted in Tarasti anthology
Monday, 7 May 2018
Wednesday, 4 April 2018
Chapter selection for new Ex.Phil. anthology
Sunday, 11 February 2018
To edit new/revised Ex.Phil. anthology
Monday, 23 January 2017
Anthology meeting
Friday, 25 November 2016
Revision of family policy chapter
Tuesday, 20 September 2016
Anthology meeting attended
Thursday, 16 June 2016
Book anthology seminar attended
Wednesday, 2 March 2016
To co-write article on family topic
Monday, 13 May 2013
Spartacus issuing press release on Norwegian HAS anthology
Tuesday, 7 May 2013
HAS anthology: Announcement link; high-res cover image
Friday, 3 May 2013
Book launch in Oslo May 15th - brief talk scheduled
Thursday, 2 May 2013
Norwegian HAS anthology proof-read; to be released May 15th
Final version of cover:
Friday, 4 January 2013
Abstract to animal meta-ethics anthology: "Beyond sentience: Biosemiotics as foundation for animal and environmental ethics"
Beyond sentience: Biosemiotics as foundation for animal and environmental ethics
Morten Tønnessen (University of Stavanger, Norway) and Jonathan Beever (Purdue University, USA)
In this chapter we argue that biosemiotics can and should serve as foundation for animal and environmental ethics, particularly with regard to justifying attribution of moral status to non-humans. Our contribution rests on a contemporary semiotic interpretation of the Umwelt theory of Jakob von Uexküll (1864-1944), one of the founding fathers of ethology.
Our approach argues that sentience is not coextensive with phenomenal subjective experience, but instead is a particular instance of such experience. In an Uexküllian sense, all living beings, even unicellular beings, have subjective experience by having semiotic agency, the capacity to navigate in a world of signs (aka the capacity for signification). The reason why moral status (general moral considerability) and moral value should be attributed to all living beings is that all living being have semiotic agency. This latter assertion implies that
- there is a world of experience that means something to each living creature, and
- all living beings are capable of distinguishing between what is attractive (good) to them, what is repulsive (bad) to them, and what has no function for them.
Our actions might affect the wellbeing of any living creature insofar as they affect its worlds of experience and action. Whereas sentience has traditionally been understood in relation to the moral weight of suffering and pain in particular, our approach involves an acknowledgement that the wider ground of sentience is a reality of subjective experience that is omnipresent in the realm of the living at large.
Scientific questions such as How widespread is sentience in the animal kingdom? are certainly of continued interest. What we suggest is that we start out by recognizing what is common to all living organisms, namely their semiotic agency, and that this stand should inform these other discourses as well.
Attribution of moral status can be done at different levels of biological organization. We hold that moral status and value should be attributed at various levels simultaneously. Our basic premise, that semiotic agency is the soundest foundation for attributing moral status and value, suggests a certain (but not exclusive) emphasis on subjective experience and thus on the level of the organism/individual, where applicable. However, individuality is no simple notion, and the organism’s character of being already-ecological points to valuation of ecological levels too. An account of animal ethics, on this relational view, demands a complementary account of valuation of those environmental relations as well.
We propose particularism[1] defined by the normative maxim that each living being deserves to be treated well in accordance with its specific needs. These needs vary so much that it neither makes sense to value all living beings evenly nor to rank them hierarchically. Proper treatment of different living beings has to be case-specific and take species-specific and other needs into consideration. Facilitating the fulfillment of the needs of the living to the greatest extent possible is what ethics is all about.
[1] Not to be confused with “moral particularism”, Hare 1963.

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