CCS paper proposal for IAEP rejected

I have been notified by the organisers of the 2026 digital conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP) that my paper "The ethical case against Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)" has been rejected.

Proposal submitted to 2026 IAEP organizers: "The ethical case against Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)"

I have just submitted the abstract and proposal below to the organisers of the 2026 digital conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP).

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The ethical case against Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)  

SHORT ABSTRACT  

Based on ethical considerations, this paper argues against the use of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as a climate mitigation measure. CCS has become increasingly central as a proposed mitigation measure. However, despite the widespread claim and perception that CCS is a necessity, CCS as practiced to date has been found to be net CO2 additive, and the Net Zero goal has been misappropriated by fossil fuel interests. Key arguments against CCS are derived from the perspective of interspecies justice, and from the perspective of intergenerational justice and fairness. In the latter context, CCS exemplifies unfair intergenerational externalization of costs.  

PROPOSAL 

In the global discourse, CCS has become increasingly central as a proposed mitigation measure, particularly after Net Zero targets were added to the global agenda with full force with the Paris agreement. The Net Zero goal presupposes Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR), which may involve the use of so-called negative emission technologies (NETs), which in turn in some cases involve CCS. The Net Zero goal has arguably been misappropriated by fossil fuel interests and their allies to promote an agenda that seeks to avoid rapidly phasing out fossil fuels. Despite the widespread claim and perception that CCS is a necessity, CCS as practiced to date has been found to be net CO2 additive (Sekera and Lichtenberger 2020). In the big picture emission reductions from CCS are uncertain, whereas research has established that CCS mitigation measures result in mitigation deterrence and climate delay.

Regrettably, CCS has not triggered much debate in climate ethics. On a general note, I find it disappointing that anthropocentric perspectives predominate in climate ethics given that some of the most prominent philosophers engaged with climate ethics, such as Dale Jamieson (2010) and Peter Singer (2009), are well-known for their work in animal ethics. Still, neither of them emphasize interspecies justice in the context of climate ethics (see also Callicott 2011). Interspecies justice is particularly relevant in ethical discussions about CCS in two ways: Firstly, in so far as CCS policies contribute to allowing continued greenhouse gas emissions and an overshoot in emissions, this will contribute to exacerbate the impact of climate change, including for non-humans. Secondly, in so far as non-humans are harmfully affected by the transportation of CO2 and long-term dedicated geological storage of CO2 in subsurface environments, this is a direct consequence of CCS policies. This point is particularly pertinent in light of recent scientific discoveries concerning life dwelling in deep-sea and subsurface environments, which include animal habitats in the subsurface (Bright, Gollner et al. 2024). Lastly, while future generations is a common concern in environmental ethics, this perspective have not received much attention in the context of CCS. With its required time horizon of at least 10,000 years for underground CO2 storages (Lindeberg 2003), CCS is a perfect example of intergenerational externalization of costs in a climate change context. This arguably makes CCS unacceptable from the perspective of intergenerational justice and fairness. In this context, the lacklustre climate effects of CCS to date, the widespread political willingness to rely on unproven technologies, and the lack of consensus among researchers on acceptable CO2 leakage rates, is especially concerning.   

REFERENCES 

Bright, M., S. Gollner et al. (2024), ‘Animal life in the shallow subseafloor crust at deep-sea hydrothermal vents’, Nature Communications, 15: 8466. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-52631-9  

Callicott, J. B. (2011), ‘The temporal and spatial scales of global climate change and the limits of individualistic and rationalistic ethics’, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 69: 101–16. 

Jamieson, D. (2010), ‘Climate change, responsibility, and justice’, Science and Engineering Ethics, 16: 431–45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-009-9174-x  

Lindeberg, E. (2003), ‘The quality of a CO2 repository: What is the sufficient retention time of CO2 stored underground’, in J. Gale and Y. Kaya (eds), Proceedings of Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies 6th International Conference (GHGT-6), 255–60, Elsevier Science Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044276-1/50041-6  

Sekera, J. and A. Lichtenberger (2020), ‘Assessing carbon capture: Public policy, science, and societal need: Review of the literature on industrial carbon removal’, Biophysical Economics and Sustainability, 5: 14. https://doi.org/10.1007/s41247-020-00080-5  

Singer, P. (2009), ‘Climate change as an ethical issue’, in J. Moss (ed), Climate Change and Social Justice, 39–51, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Paper "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis" presented at IAEP 2024

Today I have presented the paper “Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis” at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of The International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP 2024, held virtually May 22-24th 2024). Some 15 people attended.

IAEP 2024 paper rescheduled for May 24th

My paper «Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis» has been rescheduled. To be held at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy, IAEP 2024, which is held online May 22-24th, my presentation is now scheduled for Friday May 24th at 9-10.30 a.m. EDT (which compares to 3-4.30 p.m. CEST). It is still a part of the session “Phenomenology, Language, and Hermeneutics” (moderated by Jonathan Beever). 

See also (now outdated):

Paper "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis" scheduled for presentation online at IAEP 2024 May 22nd

Paper "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis" scheduled for presentation online at IAEP 2024 May 22nd

My paper «Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis» has been scheduled for oral presentation at the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy, IAEP 2024, which is to be held online May 22-24th, on Wednesday May 22nd at 9-10.30 a.m. EDT (which compares to 3-4.30 p.m. CEST), as part of the session “Phenomenology, Language, and Hermeneutics” (moderated by Jonathan Beever).

Paper "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis" accepted for presentation at 2024 IAEP virtual conference

I have been notified by the organizers of the 2024 virtual conference of IAEP, the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP), that my paper proposal "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis" has been accepted for oral presentation. The conference takes place online May 22-24th.

See also:

Proposal for IAEP 2024: "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis"

Proposal for IAEP 2024: "Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis"

I have composed and submitted the proposal and abstract below to the organizers of IAEP 2024, the 28th conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy, which will be held online May 22-24th.

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Umwelt phenomenology, the human condition, and the nature crisis  

PROPOSAL 

Edmund Husserl famously thematized science´ forgetting of the lifeworld in what was after his death published as Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die Tranzendentale Phänomenologie, published in English translation as The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy. In a somewhat similar way, the biologist Jakob von Uexküll, who contributed originally to theoretical biology and our understanding of science, decried the ´meaning-blind´ biology of his time. Drawing on the fact that the experience of animals is constrained by the sensory and behavioral repertoire of each organism and takes place within the context of species-specific configurations of time and space, the Umwelt theory von Uexküll developed was programmatically presented as subjective biology. This makes his Umwelt theory relevant for phenomenology, so that his work warrants the designation Umwelt phenomenology. This is also supported by the fact that central phenomenologists, including Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, have related to and made use of von Uexküll´s work. While he applied the Umwelt perspective not only to animals, but to humans as well, particularly in Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen, published in English translation as A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans, unfortunately, human Umwelten remained undertheorized in his work. Hannah Arendt, however, in her book The Human Condition, discussed the human condition and observed a crisis within the natural sciences play out as an inability to be relatable to normal speech and thought. Although she saw the significance of our evolving global perspective and power, which is today often conceptualized in terms of the Anthropocene, Arendt failed to acknowledge the decisive difference our anthropocentric bias makes in matters of ontology and epistemology alike. From the perspective of Umwelt phenomenology, I have argued that today´s environmental crisis can be conceived of as an ontological crisis involving the extinction and marginalization of myriads of lifeworlds. As is well established, the environmental crisis is characterized by extensive anthropogenic environmental change. This can be conceptualized in terms of Umwelt transitions. The ongoing nature crisis is most blatantly observable in rapidly escalating climate change, and the well-documented marginalization of wild terrestrial mammals, which now account for only 4% of terrestrial mammalian biomass, as documented by Bar-On and colleagues in their inventive work on “The biomass distribution on Earth”. Arguably, the last decades´ scientific neglect, theoretically and methodologically, of the agency, subjectivity, and worth of living beings has contributed to this intensifying and deepening nature crisis. With its objectivistic, mechanistic perspective on the natural world, the scientific enterprise has in practice facilitated and helped justify a real-life objectification, de-souling, exploitation, and commodification of living beings as mere means and resources. It is high time to replace this outdated and harmful outlook with a philosophically based scientific framework more fit for the 21st century. One way forward entails acknowledging the semiotic agency of all that lives, and start planning for the socio-ecological and economic transformations that will be required to solve the environmental crisis in the next few decades. This will have to involve a serious rethinking of the human condition and how we think about our place in nature.  

ABSTRACT 

Edmund Husserl famously thematized science´ forgetting of the lifeworld. In a somewhat similar way, the theoretical biologist Jakob von Uexküll decried the ´meaning-blind´ biology of his time, developing what I call “Umwelt phenomenology”. In her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt observed a crisis within the natural sciences play out as an inability to be relatable to normal speech and thought. I discuss the ongoing nature crisis in light of these perspectives, and make some observations on how we can rethink matters related to the human condition, our place in nature, and science´s role in justifying exploitation of living beings.

Minimizing anthropogenic mortality paper not selected for virtual IAEP 2020 conference

I have been notified by organizers that my paper proposal "The case for minimizing anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management" has not been selected for the program of the virtual version of the 2020 conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP). The conference was originally to be held in Toronto in October.

IAEP conference cancelled

I have been notified that the annual conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy (IAEP), planned for Toronto 10-11 October, has been cancelled, at least in that format and at that location.

See also:

Paper proposal for IAEP 2020: "The case for minimizing anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management"

Paper proposal for IAEP 2020: "The case for minimizing anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management"

I have just composed and submitted my paper abstract "The case for minimizing anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management" to the organizers of the 2020 conference of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy, to be held in Toronto, Canada, October 10-12th.

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The case for minimizing anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management  

PROPOSAL 

Recent research has established that humans currently act as an unsustainable super-predator, with kill rates that by far surpasses the kill rates of other predators (Darimont et al. 2015). This is a key factor behind the contemporary marginalization of wildlife globally and the escalating biodiversity crisis. Darimont et al. (2015) suggest that humans should regard other predators as representing models of sustainable behaviour and aim for reducing kill rates until they are at comparable levels. This may be characterized as the “sustainable predation” view. While I have some sympathy for that view, I instead propose the “minimizing predation” view, which holds that anthropogenic mortality in wildlife management (i.e. the extent of deaths among wildlife caused by humans) should be minimized. I suggest that this should be a central goal in wildlife management, and that society´s performance with regard to reducing anthropogenic mortality among wildlife should be seen as a key success factor in the assessment of conservation efforts. 

Conceptually, this discussion should take a wide, comprehensive notion of wildlife management as its starting point, since this is what makes most sense from a human ecology perspective. Conceived of in this way, wildlife management involves any management of wildlife by the hands of humans, regardless of whether the management is public or private, whether it is legal or illegal, and whether it is related to sustenance (hunting or fishing), regulation of animal populations, or any other lethal or non-lethal encounters between humans and wild animals. With such a comprehensive notion of wildlife management, any encounter between humans and wild animals falls within the scope of our discussion. 

The finding that humans are currently unsustainable super-predators is reflected in the fact that many today regard “wildlife management” as synonymous with making use of lethal management practices. I experienced this first-hand when I once called my local wildlife committee for advice on how to handle a baby seagull gone astray just outside my entrance door and was advised to get a firm grip around its neck and bang its head against the wall. Killing appears to be the gut reaction of many humans whenever they encounter wild animals that they perceive to cause problems. Whether one adopts the “sustainable predation” view or the “minimizing predation” view, changing the human mindset towards wild animals will require persistent and long-term action, and a vigorous focus on non-lethal ways to treat animals. 

The main arguments in favor of the “minimizing predation” view can be outlined as follows:  

1. Humans have a moral responsibility that implies that the killing of animals must be justified in terms of needs and in light of possible alternative actions; if killings are not justified by the satisfaction of needs, or if alternative actions are practically and morally preferable, then the killings in question should not occur. 
2. Given the currently historically high human population, even kill rates on par with those of other predators will likely result in an excessive human ecological dominance which may not be reconcilable with acknowledging the intrinsic value of all sentient beings and/or resolving the biodiversity crisis. 
3. Pragmatically, reducing kill rates as much as possible is preferable to any fixed goal.  

On a final note, the discussion outlined here could at some later occasion fruitfully be expanded to also address issues related to liminal animals, many of which are treated as pest species (cf. the baby seagull); domesticated animals, most of which are killed routinely; and non-animal wildlife.  

Reference 

Darimont, Chris T., Caroline H. Fox, Heather M. Bryan and Thomas E. Reimchen. 2015. The unique ecology of human predators. Science 349 (6250): 858–861.   

SHORT ABSTRACT 

I argue that anthropogenic mortality (deaths caused by humans) among wildlife should be minimized, suggest that this should be a central goal in wildlife management, and that society´s performance with regard to reaching this goal should be seen as a key success factor in the assessment of conservation efforts. This “minimizing predation” view is contrasted with the “sustainable predation” view which implies that human kill rates should be reduced until they are on par with the kill rates of non-human predators. I outline a moral, an ecological, and a pragmatic argument in favor of the “minimizing predation” view.