Council of animal ethics meeting attended

Yesterday I attended the meeting of Norway´s Council for animal ethics, which was held at Thon Hotel Opera in Oslo. Among other things, I gave a status report on our consultative statement on the Norwegian pension fund global´s investments in food production and similar, and on two international declarations on animal consciousness (Cambridge and New York).

The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness getting widespread media attention (BBC, NBC, New Scientist, etc.)

The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which I have signed, although after it was launched April 19th (I was not among the initial signatories), has been getting extensive media coverage in major news outlets, most of it before my signature was added to the list of signatories on April 23rd. This includes:

Scientists push new paradigm of animal consciousness, saying even insects may be sentient (NBC News, April 19th)

It’s ‘irresponsible’ to ignore widespread consciousness across animal world, dozens of scientists argue (The Hill, April 19th)

Consciousness a ‘realistic possibility’ in birds, fish, squid and bees, scholars say (The Globe and Mail, April 22nd)

Scientists believe insects may have feelings (BBC, April 22nd)

Some scientists say insects are conscious – it doesn't settle anything (New Scientist, April 23rd - paywall)

See also:

"New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness" signed (April 23)

"New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness" signed

I have signed the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which was launched April 19th 2024 at New York University. See also an informative background text. PS: I was not among the initial signatories.

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The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness 

Which animals have the capacity for conscious experience? While much uncertainty remains, some points of wide agreement have emerged. 

First, there is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds. 

Second, the empirical evidence indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects). 

Third, when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore that possibility in decisions affecting that animal. We should consider welfare risks and use the evidence to inform our responses to these risks.