I have been scheduled to present at Dyreetikkonferansen 2024 (the Norwegian animal ethics conference 2024), which takes place at Litteraturhuset, Oslo, on Wednesday November 20th, with the theme "Er du bevisst dyrs bevissthet?" (Are you conscious of animals´ consciousness?). The title of my talk is "Hvordan er det å være et dyr?" (What is it like to be an animal?).
More info (in Norwegian) on the website of Norway´s Council for animal ethics.
Yesterday I attended the meeting of Norway´s Council for animal ethics, which was held at Thon Hotel Opera in Oslo. Among other things, I gave a status report on our consultative statement on the Norwegian pension fund global´s investments in food production and similar, and on two international declarations on animal consciousness (Cambridge and New York).
I have signed the New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness, which was launched April 19th 2024 at New York University. See also an informative background text. PS: I was not among the initial signatories.
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The New York Declaration on Animal Consciousness
Which animals have the capacity for conscious experience? While much uncertainty remains, some points of wide agreement have emerged.
First, there is strong scientific support for attributions of conscious experience to other mammals and to birds.
Second, the empirical evidence indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes) and many invertebrates (including, at minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects).
Third, when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore that possibility in decisions affecting that animal. We should consider welfare risks and use the evidence to inform our responses to these risks.
My brief commentary article "The Evolutionary Origin(s) of the Umwelt. Biosemiotics" is included in this Spring´s readings for the reading group “Signs in Nature” at Middlesex University, along with Jablonka and Ginsburg´s Target article "Learning and the Evolution of Conscious Agents". This will happen in the session "Consciousness and Umwelt", which takes place Friday April 19th online.
In the recently published article "Living and Experiencing: Response to Commentaries", published in Biosemiotics, Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg respond to my commentary "The Evolutionary Origin(s) of the Umwelt", which was one out of several commentaries on their 2022 target article "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". While they overall present another impressively comprehensive article on the character, diversity and range of life, I feel that some of my views are misrepresented in their comments.
Excerpts:
Olteanu too (2022) points to the resonance between our theory and the biosemiotic approach to learning and consciousness, while other biosemioticians [Campbell (2022), Hendlin (2023), Tønnesson (2022)] emphasize both the common ground and the need to incorporate terms such as Umwelt into our framework and to expand on the continuity between life and mind.
No problem here.
The assumption that there is no life without sentience is reflected in the biopsychic stance of some of our commentators, who regard all living beings, from bacteria to humans, as sentient. This biopsychic assumption is clearly stated by Reber et al. (2022) and by Meincke (2023), but a biopsychic stance is also implied in the commentaries of Hendlin (2023), Tønnessen (2022), and Riskin (2023).
I do not think this is accurate. I make no claim in my commentary that I think it is fair to characterize as adopting a biopsychic stance implying that all life is sentient. On the contrary, I distinguish clearly between sentient and non-sentient organisms, and thematize the emergence of sentience during the Cambrian explosion.
Maybe the a priori assumption that intrinsic value must be mentally experienced is related to a different understanding of the terms “subject” and “subjective experiencing”. Subjective experiencing, as Tønnessen (2022) defines it, is “the experiencing of the subject”. However, a “subject”, as we understand the term, does not necessarily have mental states. A subject does have closure (and hence also a necessary inwardness and individuality) and is an agent that interacts with object/s external to it, reacting differently to world-generated and self-generated identical stimuli. Such reafferent reactions, were, we suggested, the non-mental precursors of the mental sense of self, and such reactions may be thought of as constituting “subjecthood”. But such subjecthood is as yet not mental subjecthood. Olteanu (2022) may have interpreted our usage of the term “subjective” in biosemiotic terms (as belonging to a subject, as subjecthood) and not in the common sense of equating “subjective experiencing” with “mental experiencing”, implying private, mental states such as perceiving the taste of banana ice cream and feeling fear.
I agree that not all subjects have mental states, and that some subjecthood is mental whether other organisms´ subjecthood is non-mental. What I criticized in my commentary was Jablonka and Ginsburg´s conflation of subjective experience with consciousness in their target article. Specifically, I questioned "one of its basic premises, namely that it is justified to “use the terms consciousness and subjective experiencing as synonyms” (p. 2)".
As Tønnessen (2022) rightly points out, the origin of the Umwelt is very ancient. We believe, as we think he does, that the co-construction of organisms and their relevant environment is as ancient as life itself. We also agree with him that a “sense saturated” Umwelten emerged during the Cambrian (with UAL), but we do not understand the basis of his claim that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience.
I make no claim in my commentary to the effect "that a primitive, mental sense of self preceded the Umwelten of sentient, Cambrian animals, and that the notion of Umwelt presupposes sentience." This is misrepresenting my views. I refer to nothing "mental" in my commentary, clearly distinguish between conscious and non-conscious organisms, with and without the capacity for sensation, and my portrayal of the emergence of "sense-saturated" Umwelten, on the background of non-sentient Umwelten, clearly opposes the views that Jablonka and Ginsburg attribute to me.
In my commentary, I write:
"The origin of the Umwelt did not coincide with the origin of sentience or consciousness. Nor did subjecthood, or subjective experience, emerge during the Cambrian explosion, though more complex forms of subjective experience evolved at this time."
I find it hard to understand how this can be taken to imply that all life is sentient and conscious, as Jablonka and Ginsburg appear to think is my view. "Subjective experience", in my view, "is a graded phenomenon, and evolved gradually to more complex forms as organisms evolved from simple organisms to more complex organisms."
Today I have had half an article day, devoted mostly to writing a commentary to a Target article by Eva Jablonka and Simona Ginsburg, "Learning and the evolution of conscious agents". The work title of my commentary is "The evolutionary origin(s) of the Umwelt". I also added a couple of references to my book manuscript Captured. Altogether I wrote some 800 words.
Number of writing days this Autumn is 8,5 so far.
